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THE STATUS OF GRADUATE STUDENTS
AND THAT OF MEDICAL RESIDENTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT AS A STARTING POINT
FOR CRAFTING A STATUTORY
DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE"
Hundreds of graduate students rat Yale and Columbia]
will not teach classes, hold review sessions or participate in
research next week.
The strike will be the first by Ivy League graduate students
since the National Labor Relations Board ruled last year that
graduate students at private colleges are students, not
workers, and cannot form unions.
As a result of that decision, graduate students can win
recognition only if university administrators voluntarily grant
it-something they have refused to do.
Organizers say they hope the combined pressure of
simultaneous strikes on two campuses will help reverse that
stance.
"By asserting this as one voice, we're identifying what we
have in common: that we should be recognized as legal
workers and be respected and given bargaining rights," said
Dehlia Hannah, a graduate student in philosophy at
Columbia.
University officials say their position has not changed.
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"Our relationship with graduate students is educational
and collaborative, not an employer-employee relationship,"
said a Columbia spokeswoman, Alissa Kaplan Michaels,
echoing the responses of Yale, Brown University and the
University of Pennsylvania.'
So goes the debate that originated in 1967 when University of
Wisconsin graduate students formed the first graduate student union,
the Teaching Assistants Association.2 Since then, countless graduate
students have asserted that they provide a valuable service to the
university and thus are employees like all other university workers.
Universities always counter that the graduate students are there to
receive an education, not to work, and therefore are very different
from other university workers. This debate has been replicated
between medical residents and hospitals.
The primary issue discussed in this Note is whether graduate
students and hospital house staff, including medical residents, are
employees for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (the
"NLRA" or the "Act") and hence entitled to engage in collective
bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB" or the
"Board") has recently used two different tests to determine whether
the groups are appropriate units for collective bargaining. Thus, a
main focus of this Note will be to develop a uniform test, or
definition, to apply to all cases involving NLRA status
determinations.3 In developing this test, an attempt will be made to
foster more consistent results than shown in the past Board decisions,
while recognizing that the Board prefers to regulate through
adjudication rather than rulemaking.
Part I provides background on the NLRA and the NLRB as well as
an overview of the NLRB 's inconsistent treatment of graduate
students and house staff. Part H discusses why the tests the Board
currently uses to make status determinations are inadequate. Part II
also includes brief comment on the tests used to make the same status
determ-ination under other federal labor and employment statutes. Part
III proposes a new test that incorporates the strengths of the tests
the NLRB currently uses while simultaneously addressing the
weaknesses of these tests. The new test also provides a greater
IGraduate Students at Yale and Columbia Plan One-Week Strike in Push for Union
Recognition, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at BL10.
2 Kevin Mattson and Patrick Kavanagh, Graduate Student Radicalism, PERSP. ON MIST.,
Nov. 1999, at 37, 37.
3"Status determination" as used in this Note refers to the determination as to whether a
given worker is an employee under the NLRA.
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likelihood of consistent results by imposing bright-line guides that the
adjudicator may diverge from only if the party arguing for such
divergence meets a heightened burden of proof. Part IV discusses the
application of the new test to graduate students and house staff,
ultimately concluding that graduate students are not employees under
the Act, but house staff are. Part V considers the advantages of having
one consistent status test that applies to all federal labor and
employment statutes and discusses whether the proposed test is
capable of such an application.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA for the purposes of
combating disruption of industry by labor-management disputes and
promoting economic and social progress.4 In its present form, the
NLRA has broad jurisdiction that is limited only by the Constitution
and the definitions contained in section 2 of the Act. Section 2
includes definitions of "employers" and "employees." For the
purposes of this Note, these definitions' relevant aspects are that: (1)
the definition of "employer" explicitly excludes the government as an
employer under the Act;5 and (2) the definition of "employee" is
circular and vague.6
A. Section 2(3)-Employee "Shall Include Any Employee"
Like the definitions used in many employment statutes,7 the
definition of employee provided in Section 2(3) of the NLRA is
ambiguous. The exact language of the definition is as follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
41 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 27-28 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006).
5National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) ("The term
'employer' [for purposes of the Act] . .. shall not include the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation . .. or any State or political subdivision thereof. .. ). Thus,
the rights of workers at public universities or hospitals are not governed by the NLRA, but
rather are governed by state law.
6 See infra Part I.A for the definition.
ISee, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act §3(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006) ("[T1he term
'employee' means any individual employed by an employer."); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act § I1I(f), 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2006) ("The term 'employee' means an individual
employed by any employer. .. )
23
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not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by
his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act .... 8
Due to the vague definition of "employee," courts and the NLRB
have generally looked beyond the explicit language of the NLRA to
determine whether any particular person is an employee for purposes
of the Act. An employee under the Act is entitled to all the rights
contained therein. Paramount among these rights is the right to choose
union representation in negotiations with the employer-i.e., the right
to collective bargaining-and the right to remedies for unfair labor
practices. 9 This Note focuses on whether graduate students
performing services for universities and house staff serving hospitals
are employees under the NLRA. The most important implication of
such a finding would be that universities and hospitals would be
required to engage in collective bargaining with graduate students and
house staffs should the groups so choose. 10
B. Overview of the NLRB 's Treatment of Graduate Students
Originally, the NLRB did not assert jurisdiction over private
universities and hence did not consider the status of graduate
students" under the NLRA. 12However, in its 1970 Cornell University
decision, 13 the Board asserted jurisdiction over private universities on
the basis that universities engage in interstate commerce. In that case,
829 U.S.C. § 152(3).
9See National Labor Relations Board Fact Sheet, http://www.nlrb.gov/About-Us/
Overview/fact-sheet.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (discussing the rights granted by the
NLRA).
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (providing information regarding election procedures under the
NLRA). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 537-635 (providing an
overview of representation proceedings and elections).
1"Graduate students" as used in this Note includes teaching assistants, research
assistants, and proctors whose duties generally include teaching classes and leading small
discussion groups, performing research under grants provided to faculty members, and
administrative duties.
12 Gregory Gartland, Of Ducks and Dissertations: A Call for A Return to the National
Labor Relations Board's "Primary Purpose Test" in Determining the Status of Graduate
Assistants under the National Labor Relations Act, 4 U. PA. J. LABu. & EMP. L. 623, 626 (2002)
("Historically, the Board was hesitant to bring private universities under the umbrella of the
NLRA. .. )
13 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
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the Board ultimately certified a group of non-academic employees as
an appropriate bargaining unit. 14 In its 1972 Adeiphi University
decision,' 5 the Board first confronted graduate students attempting to
exercise the rights provided for in the NLRA. In Adeiphi University,
the proposed bargaining unit consisted of graduate students,
professors, and library staff.'16 In refusing to certify the unit, the Board
did not reach the question of whether the students were employees for
purposes of the Act, but rather held that the bargaining unit lacked the
"community of interest" required by section 9(a). 17
Two years later, the Board directly confronted the status of
graduate students in Leland Stanford Junior University' ("tnOrd").
Stanford could not be disposed of on the ground that the proposed
bargaining group lacked "community of interest" because the group
was made up exclusively of physics research assistants. 19 However,
the Board still refused to certify the unit on the basis that "the
research assistants in the physics department are primarily students
[and thus] are not employees within the meaning of Section 2(2) rsic]
of the Act.",20 In applying what became known as the "primary
purpose" test, the Board placed heavy emphasis on several facts: all
the services the students performed were "toward the goal of
obtaining the Ph.D. degree"; the payment was a form of financial aid
since there was "no correlation" between work performed or hours
spent and the payment received; the students did not receive the
fringe benefits normally associated with employment; the payments
made to students were tax exempt; the students received academic
credit for their work; and the students were not subject to discharge
for unsatisfactory performance .2 1 Thus, the Board provided factors to
consider in applying the "primary purpose" test.
14 Id. at 334.
15 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
6 Id. at 639.
17 Id. at 640; see also Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962)
(discussing the factors used in determining whether a proposed bargaining unit has a
"community of interest"); I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 643-44
("Community of interest is not susceptible to precise definition .. The Board ... attemptis] to
summarize the concept as follows: '[wiether the employees are organized into a separate
department; have distinct skills and training; have distinct job functions and perform distinct
work . . . ; are functionally integrated with the Employer's other employees; have frequent
contact with other employees; . .. have distinct terms and conditions of employment; and are
separately supervised."' (quoting United Operations Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 123, 123 (2002))).
18 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
29 Id. at 6231.
20 Id. at 622-3.
25
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The Board used the "primary purpose" test to determine the status
of workers for almost thirty years.2 Where a worker's primary
purpose was not economic, the Board consistently held that the
worker was not an employee within the meaning of the NLRA.2
However, in 1999, in Boston Medical Center Corp. ,24 the Board
developed a different test, the "function" test.25 It focuses on whether
a worker is a common-law employee. In 2000, the Board applied this
less stringent test to a case involving graduate students26 and reversed
twenty-six years of precedent.27 In New York University, 28 the Board
used the "function" test to hold that a group of graduate teaching and
research assistants was an appropriate bargaining unit under section
9(a) of the Act.2 In applying the "function" test, the Board focused
on a narrow analysis 30-"graduate assistants perform services under
the control and direction of the Employer, and they are compensated
for these services by the Employer.",3'1 Thus, the Board greatly
simplified the test for determining whether a person is an employee
within the meaning of section 2(3)-any person who would be an
employee at common law is an "employee."3
The application of the "function" test to graduate students was
short-lived. Four years after New York University, the Board restored
the "primary purpose" test. In Brown University, 33 in a two-three
ruling, the Board held that a group of graduate students working as
teaching assistants, research assistants, and proctors was not an
appropriate bargaining unit and as such did not have the right to
engage in collective bargaining. While the Board used the "primary
purpose" test, 3 4 a footnote suggested that the Board would not have
22 Elizabeth Butler Baum, Casenote, NLRB Refuses to Harm "Academic Freedom" at
Universities by Permitting Graduate Student Assistants to Unionize, 56 MERCER L. REV. 793,
796-97 (2005).
23 See, e.g., St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003 (1977), overruled
by Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B.
251, 254 (1976), overruled by Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
24 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999). See infra Part i.C for discussion of this case.
23 Id. at 159.
2- 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
27 See supra note 22.
28 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
29 National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006).
30 The accuracy of this analysis has been questioned. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483,
490 n.27 (2004) (suggesting that even under the "function" test, graduate students are not
employees for purposes of the Act).
31 New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206.
32 Id.
33 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
34 Use of the "primary purpose" test is evidenced by statements such as, 'the relationship
between Brown and its graduate student assistants is primarily academic." Id. at 492.
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certified the unit even under the "function" test.3 Though there were
differences between the students seeking certification in New York
University and those seeking certification in Brown University, 36
these differences were most likely irrelevant under the "primary
purpose" test .3 ' Thus, under current law, most graduate students are
not employees for purposes of the NLRA.3
The Brown University majority bolstered its opinion with a series
of policy arguments that were not mentioned in Stanford .39 The Board
derived the policy arguments from one central theme: "collective
bargaining is not particularly well suited to educational
decisionmaking and . . . any change in emphasis from quality
education to economic concerns will 'prove detrimental to both labor
and educational policies."' 40 From this premise, the Board concluded
that since the students' and universities' goals were not adverse,'4 it
was unnecessary to achieve the main purpose of collective
bargaining--equality of bargaining power. The Board went on to
conclude that attaining equality of bargaining power was not only
unnecessary, but also undesirable.4 Since equal bargaining power
"would unduly infringe upon traditional academic freedoms," it
would not be a wise policy decision to certify the unit of students.4 In
other words, students should not be permitted to bargain (with
persons far more experienced) regarding the requirements to obtain an
educational degree.
The dissent responded to these policy concerns by attacking the
assumption that universities are the same as they were when the
35 Id. at 490 n.27.
36 See Sheldon D. Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions, and Brown
University, 20 LAB. LAW. 243, 254 (2004) (noting that the Brown students were receiving
academic credit for their work while the majority of the New York University students were not,
and the work was not a degree requirement for most New York University students whereas the
work was required of Brown students).
37 See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1207 (stating that the Board does not contest the
large educational benefits graduate students derive from working for the university, but rather
thinks that such benefits are not relevant to making the status determinaion-" the fact that [the
graduate students] 'obtain educational benefits from their employment' is not inconsistent with
employee status" (quoting Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 161 (1999))).
38 In extreme situations where the duties a student performs for a university are
completely unrelated to achieving a degree and hold no educational benefit, the performing
student may satisfy the "primary purpose" test. But see San Francisco Art Inst., 226 N.L.R.B.
1251 (1976) (holding that bargaining unit made up exclusively of students working part-time
as janitors at their university should not be certified because the students' interests in their
part-time employment is tenuous and secondary to their educational interest).
39 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489 (quoting St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229
N.R.L.B 1000, 1002 (1977)).
40 Id.
41' Rather, the parties shared the mutual goal of the students obtaining educations.
42 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490.
43 Id.
27
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Board originally addressed the status of graduate students under the
Act.44 The dissent argued that in light of the nature of today's
university, the underlying purposes of the Act would be served by
providing graduate students with the NLRA's protections.4 However,
the main thrust of the dissent's argument was not policy, but
statutory-the "function" test applied because "[~a]bsent compelling
indications of Congressional intent, the Board simply is not free to
create an exclusion from the Act's coverage for a category of workers
who meet the literal statutory definition of employees."4
Despite the dissent's argument, the "primary purpose" test is the
current applicable law, and, therefore, graduate students do not
currently have a right based on the NLRA to engage in collective
bargaining.
C. Overview of the NLRB's Treatment of House Staff
The Board's decisions regarding the status of hospital house staff47
under the NLRA has followed a course similar to its decisions
regarding graduate students. Until the 1974 Health Care Institution
Amendments to the NLRA, the Board asserted jurisdiction over only
a limited class of health care providers. 48  However, the 1974
Amendments provided the Board with wide-ranging jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction over non-profit hospitals.4
The first case involving the status of house staff arose in the
context of a non-profit hospital. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 50 a
group of house staff sought certification as "employees" under the
NLRA. The Board denied certification in an opinion that echoed
Stanford. Though there are clear differences between graduate
44 "American higher education was being transformed even as the Board's 'traditional'
approach to graduate student unionization developed. . . . '[A] big corporation has replaced the
once self-centered company of scholars."' Id. at 497 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting)
(quoting JACQuES BARzuN, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: How IT RuNs, WHERE IT Is GOING 3
(1968)).
45 Id. at 497-98 (noting that universities are becoming much more dependent upon
graduate students to perform the functions of tenured faculty).
46 Id. at 496.
47 "House staff" as used in this Note includes medical interns, residents, and fellows who
are working at a hospital in furtherance of full medical licensure, certifications in specialties,
and certifications in sub-specialties, respectively.
48 See 1 THEi DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 69 (stating that generally, prior to
the Amendments, the Board only had jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals and nursing homes
that otherwise met its jurisdictional standards).
49 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (2006) (defining "health care institution" to include "any hospital,
convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended
care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm or aged person").
50 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976), overruled by Boston Med. Ctr. Corp.. 330 N.L.R.B. 152
(1999).
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students and house staff that arguably bring house staff closer to
"temployee" status, the Board held that "the educational relationship
that exists between the housestaff and Cedars-Sinai (a teaching
hospital). .. leads us to conclude ... that the housestaff' s relationship
with Cedars-Sinai is an educational rather than an employment
relationship. 5
In reaching this conclusion regarding the house staff s primary
purpose, the Board considered the following facts determinative: the
purpose of members of the house staff was not to earn a living but
rather to fulfill a requirement for the practice of medicine; the
compensation was not related to the hours worked or type of services
provided; the programs were designed to optimize the learning
experience (as opposed to maximizing benefits to the hospital); there
was no expectation of an ongoing employment relationship when
house staff completed the program; and there were regular
evaluations that were similar to grades and examinations.5 Thus,
Cedars-Sinai applied the "primary purpose" test that the Board first
announced in Stanford.
Another case involving house staff further clarified the "primary
purpose" test.5 In St. Clare 's Hospital & Health Center,4 the Board
emphasized how policy considerations supplement the application of
the "primary purpose" test. Similar to its underlying policy arguments
in Brown University, the Board emphasized that collective bargaining
was not suitable to the relationship between house staff and hospitals
because equality of bargaining power is not desirable in educational
settings. The Board elaborated as follows:
[T]he student-teacher relationship is an inherently
inequalitarian one, it being assumed that the teacher, by virtue
of superior knowledge and experience, is in a better position
to determine the most appropriate course of instruction and
method of proceeding. In this respect, the teacher and student
have mutual interest in the advancement of the student's
education. Such mutuality of goals rarely exists in the typical
employment relationship, and goes far towards explaining
why collective bargaining can flourish in one sphere while
constituting an anathema in the other.
51 Id. at 253.
52 Id. at 253-54.
53 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977), overruled by Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152
(1999).
54 Id.
29
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* * , [If collective bargaining were permitted] it wouldfollow that many academic freedoms would become
bargainable as wages, hours, or terms and conditions of
employment. Once this occurs, Board involvement in matters
of strictly academic concern is only a petition or an unfair
55labor practice charge away.
Additionally, the Board in St. Clare 's Hospital noted that the
process the house staff was undergoing was a personal one and
therefore not amenable to collective bargaining. A final notable aspect
of the St. Clare 's Hospital decision is that the Board sought to create
bright-line rules by dividing student workers into four categories: (1)
students employed by a commercial employer for work unrelated to
their studies; (2) students employed by their academic institution for
work unrelated to their studies; (3) students employed by a
commercial employer for work related to their studies; and (4)
students employed by their academic institution for work related to
their studies.5
Students falling into the first group are employees under the Act.5"
The opinion was not entirely clear on the status of students in the
second group, instead focusing on whether such students would share
a "community of interest" with those with whom they worked .58
However, the Board did cite examples in which such students would
be employees under the Act .59 The Board held that students in the
third and fourth categories were "primarily students" and, as such,
were not covered by the NLRA.60 The Board concluded that house
staff fall into the fourth category and therefore are not employees
within the meaning of section 2(3).61
While the clarity provided by the "four categories" analysis may
seem minimal, it does provide an example of how, without actual
rulemaking, the Board can make its decisions more consistent.
Creating flexible categories of workers or some other type of
adaptable, general rule may be extremely helpful in crafting a solution
62
to the overarching issue of who is an employee under the NLRA.
55 Id. at 1002-03.
56 Id. at 1000-02.
57 Id. at 1001.
58 Id.
59 E.g., id. at 1001 n.18 (citing Benzschawel, 210 N.L.R.B. 349, (1974)).
605 Id. at 1001-02
61 Id. at 1002-03.
62 See infra Part III for how bright-line guidelines contribute to the strength of the new
test proposed by this Note.
Vol. 59:41230
2009] CRAFTING A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE" 13
For twenty-three years, the Board consistently held that house staff
did not fall within the ambit of the NLRA and as such did not have
collective bargaining rights.6 However, in a dramatic reversal in
1999, the Board applied the "function" test-involving common law
agency principles -to a case involving house staff. In Boston
Medical Center Corp., ,65 the Board held that house staff are
"employees," and, thus, hospitals are required to engage in collective
bargaining should the house staff so desire.6 As discussed previously,
the Board applied the "function" test to graduate students one year
later in New York University. 6 1 In applying the "function" test in
Boston Medical Center, the Board found the following facts
dispositive: the house staff are compensated for their services and are
not eligible for a student tax exemption;68 receive fringe benefits;
spend 80 percent of their time engaged in direct patient care; and are
unlike those in a traditional academic setting.69 The "function" test is
still good law with regard to house staff; thus, currently, house staff
are "employees" entitled to all rights afforded by the NLRA,
including collective bargaining.
11. THE "PRIMARY PURPOSE" ANT) "FuNcTiON" TESTS ARE
INADEQUATE
Both tests employed by the Board have significant shortcomings-
notably, on their faces, both fail to take into account policy
considerations. Policy considerations are important in light of the
critical effects unionization can have on both employers and
employees.7 Congress recognized that in certain instances such
effects are undesirable and explicitly excluded certain employees
63 Robert A. Epstein, Note, Breaking Down the Ivory Tower Sweatshops: Graduate
Student Assistants and Their Elusive Search for Employee Status on the Private University
Campus, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 157, 164 (2005)
64 See supra Part 1.13 for a description of the "function" test.
65 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
(, Id. at 168; see also National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006)
(providing information regarding election procedures); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 4, at 537-635 (providing an overview of representation proceedings and elections).
67 New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206.
68 This analysis may no longer be valid in light of Mayo Found for Med. Educ. &
Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp 2d 1164 (D. Minn. 2007) (holding invalid an IRS
regulation that barred any person working over forty hours per week from qualifying for a
student tax exemption, thus implicitly recognizing that house staff are eligible for student tax
exemption).
69 330 N.L.R.B. at 160-61 ("[House staff] do not pay tuition or student fees. They do not
take typical examinations ... nor do they receive grades ... "(footnote omnitted)).
70 For instance, unions often promote contractual provisions that disfavor certain groups
of employees, make it impossible for employees to negotiate on an individual basis, and in non-
Right to Work states, impose mandatory dues.
231
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from the NERA for policy reasons .7 ' Likewise, the Supreme Court
has recognized that providing coverage for certain workers would
have severe effects and therefore has upheld Board decisions that
certain workers, though not explicitly excluded in the Act's language,
are not "employees."7 Finally, as a practical matter, policy is
appropriate to consider in making the status determination because
the definition provided in section 2(3) is so ambiguous.
Neither the "primary purpose" test nor the "function" test
incorporates policy considerations. While the actual application of the
"6primary purpose" test often shows considerable incorporation of
policy concerns,7 the test itself does not require this. Furthermore,
both tests have weaknesses beyond failing to consider policy.
A. The Shortcomings of the "Primary Purpose" Test
The "primary purpose" test is inadequate in several other respects.
First, as a practical matter, there are situations where it is difficult to
determine a given worker's primary purpose. While this problem is
somewhat remedied by resorting to consideration of an objective
primary purpose-i.e., what a reasonable person in the worker's
situation would view as her primary purpose-the difficulty does not
end here. What if two purposes are equally important? This very well
may be the case with the student-athlete .75 The student-athlete has an
arguably economic purpose-to enhance his eventual value to a
professional sports team and to receive the benefits of his athletic
71 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 152(2) (2006) (persons working for non-
employers as defined in this section are not covered by the Act, for instance, workers employed
by the government); id. § 152(3) (persons specifically exempted from definition of employee as
defined in this section are not covered by the Act, for instance, workers who fit the statutory
definition of "supervisors").
72 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (holding that managerial
employees are not covered by the NLR.A).
73 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 10 1 Nw.
U. L. REv. 997, 1043 (2007) ("When a statute's clear meaning cannot be resolved by resorting
to statutory text ... or other tools of statutory construction, certain policy choices necessarily
come into play."). See generally KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 206 (1999).
71 See, e.g., Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 491 (2004) (discussing, within the
application of the "primary purpose" test, the policy implications of giving graduate students the
right to engage in collective bargaining).
75 See J. Trevor Johnston, Show Them the Money: The Threat of NCAA Athlete
Unionization in Response to the Commnercialization of College Sports, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT
L. 203 (2003) (arguing that student-athletes are "employees" under the "primary purpose" test);
Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor's New Clothes: Lifting the
NCAA 's Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 495, 499 (2008) (arguing that, under the
primary purpose test, Division I athletes are "employees"). But see Rohith A. Parasuraman,
Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J., 727,, 744-45 (2007)
(suggesting that NCAA athletes are not "employees" under the primary purpose test).
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scholarship-and an equally important educational purpose-to
attend classes at his university. This analysis highlights another
deficiency of the "primary purpose" test-namely, when is a purpose
an economic one? Most situations are clear in that a worker is
receiving money, but the student-athlete scenario is not nearly as
straightforward. While the Board's decisions understandably indicate
that a scholarship is not enough to make a student's primary purpose
economic, the decisions do not indicate the result if the student's
primary purpose in attending an institution is to play sports with the
goal of making himself attractive to a professional team and thus a
recipient of a considerable economic benefit.7
A second inadequacy of the "primary purpose" test is that it
ignores the instructions the Supreme Court gave in NLRB v. Town &
Country Electric, Inc. 7 There, the Court suggested that in instances
where Congress has not explicitly provided a definition of the term
employee, the common-law agency considerations embodied in the
"function" tes t78 are relevant to the status determination .79 The Court,
nonetheless, recognized that "when reviewing [an admninistrative
agency's] interpretation of the term 'employee' . . . we have
repeatedly said that, '[s]ince the task of defining the term "employee"
is one that "has been assigned primarily to [the administrative
agency]" . . . the [administrative agency's] construction of that term is
entitled to considerable deference...."8
Thus, though the Court recognizes that the Board is quite within its
power to create a definition that is not identical to the common-law
definition, it instructs that the Board's definition should include some
consideration of common-law agency principles. The "primary
purpose" test does not incorporate these principles, and for this
reason, as well as the practical difficulties mentioned above, it is not
an ideal test for determining whether a person is an employee under
the NLRA.
B. The Shortcomings of the "Function" Test
While the "function" test follows the Supreme Court's suggestion
in Town & Country Electric, Inc., it does so blindly without
76 Perhaps under this analysis, most students at a university have a primary purpose that is
economic-a purpose to increase their economic value in the marketplace.
77 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
78 That is, whether the worker performs services under the control or right of control of
the employer in exchange for compensation.
79 5 16 U.S. at 94.
80 Id. (second brackets in original) (last ellipses in original) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)).
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consideration of the qualifications the Court placed on using the
common-law definition of employee.8' Thus, the resulting test is far
too narrow and formalistic.
82In addition to its failure to incorporate policy considerations, the
restrictive "function" test leaves no room for consideration of the
legislative history of the Act. It is a fundamental rule that "a
reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular
statutory provision in isolation." 83  Use of legislative history is
particularly appropriate where, as here, the language of the statute is
84
ambiguous. The Board has recognized the need to ensure that its
interpretations of the NLRA are consistent with Congress's purpose
in enactment: "the Board has the discretion to determine whether it
would effectuate national labor policy to extend collective-bargaining
rights to .. . [any given] category of employees."8
Such discretion is also recognized in the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides for judicial review of agency decisions under the
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard.8 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has endorsed the view that it is appropriate for an
administrative 'agency to analyze the underlying principles of the Act
the agency is enforcing. For instance, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. ,87 the Court upheld the Board's refusal to certify managerial
employees as an appropriate bargaining unit even though section 2(3)
does not explicitly exclude the group from coverage under the
NLRA88 In so holding, the Court relied extensively on the legislative
history of the Act in determining that the purpose underlying the Act
would not be served by giving managerial employees the right to
89
engage in collective bargaining.
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing the negative consequences of
not considering policy in the status determination).
83 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (reviewing
a challenge to FDA regulation of tobacco products).
84 See, e.g., Sarah B. Fenn, Note, Panipovic v. Gonzaies: Defining Last Habitual
Residence for Stateless Asylum Applicants, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1545, 1567 (2007)
("Ordinary canons of statutory construction require courts to look at a statute's plain meaning
and legislative history to interpret ambiguous language."); Jennifer Giordano-Coltart, Note,
Walking the Line: Why the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law
Should Limit the Reach of 35 U.S.C. § 2 7](F), 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0004, 31,
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dtr/articlespdf/2007DLTROO04.pdf ("According to the
general rules of statutory construction, the Court should look first to the text of the statute and
then to legislative history." (citing AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369-71
(Fed. Cir. 2005))).
85 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483,492 (2004).
86 Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
S416 U.S. 267 (1974).
88 Id. at 289.
89 Id. at 288-89 n.16 ("The rationale for this Board policy [of excluding managerial
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Thus, in determining whether any given worker is an "employee,"
Congress's purpose for enacting the NLRA is relevant. This purpose
has been described several ways. Some commentary posits that the
underlying purpose is "to strike a balance between the conflicting and
often hostile interests of [the parties]." 90 Others claim the underlying
purpose is to "'redress the "inequality of bargaining power" between
employees and employers and permit wage earners to secure adequate
compensation and [working] conditions. 91' The Board should
exercise great caution when granting "employee" status to a category
of workers where such a grant does not serve these purposes.
Since the "function" test does not foster such caution, it results in
an over-inclusion problem. That is, under the "function" test, groups
whom the Board, often with court approval, has ruled are not
"employees" would be covered by the NLRA. For instance, under a
pure common-law analysis that "[an employment] relationship exists
when a servant performs services for another, under the other's
control or right of control, and in return for payment,",9 2 workers in
management positions would be "employees." However, the Supreme
Court held that managerial employees are not within the meaning of
Section 2(3).93 Likewise, under the "function" test, so-called
"confidential employees," whom Board decisions have excluded from
the Act,94 would have a right to engage in collective bargaining.
A final shortcoming of the "function" test is that it is too
formalistic, permitting employers to circumvent the underlying
purpose of the Act. For instance, regardless of the actual nature of an
employer's relationship with a worker, the employer can structure the
relationship to give the worker a status, i.e., that of an independent
contractor, that excludes the worker from the Act's protections.
employees from the Act] . . seems to be the reasonable belief that Congress intended to
exclude . . . [managerial employees] on the theory that they were the one[s] from whom the
workers needed protection." (last alteration in original)).
90 Gordon W. Thomas, Constitutional Law-Federal Preemption-New Jersey's Casino
Control Act Not Preempted by NLRA-Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees International
Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984), 15 SEToN HALL L. REv. 656, 682 (1985).
11 Laura Brown, Case Note, War of the Nurses: The Struggle for a Voice in National
Labor Relations Board v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001), 43 &.
Tax. L. Ray. 885, 890 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Patrick M. Kuhlmann, Comment,
The Enigma of NLRA Section 2(1 1): The Supervisory Exclusion and the Case of the Charge
Nurse, 2000 Wis. L. Ray. 157, 161).
92 New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B 1205, 1206 (2000).
93 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
94 See B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956) ("[Tjhe Board has consistently
excluded from bargaining units as confidential employees persons who assist and act in a
confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
in the field of labor relations.").
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Therefore, workers who were intended to have the right to engage in
collective bargaining may be denied this right by employers who take
advantage of the formalism of the "function" test. For all of these
reasons, the "function" test alone is not sufficient for determining
who is an employee under the NLRA.
C The Shortcomings of Tests Used in Other Employment Statutes
In addition to the "primary purpose" and "function" tests, courts
and administrative agencies use two other tests with some regularity
in determining whether a worker is an employee under various other
federal labor and employment statutes. 95' As with the Board's status
determinations, other agencies have not consistently applied the same
96status test to their respective statutes.
1. The "Economic Reality" Test
The "economic reality" test requires an adjudicator to examine the
totality of circumstances and determine "'whether, as a matter of
economic reality, the individuals "are dependent upon the business to
which they render service....... 9 While this test's "totality of
circumstances" language makes it broad enough to permit policy and
legislative history considerations, it has several weaknesses.9
There are several practical difficulties with implementing this test.
As under the "primary purpose" test, whether a worker is dependent
upon a business is a difficult determination to make even from an
objective standpoint, and is virtually impossible to make from a
subjective standpoint. Agencies and courts have embraced the
following six factors for consideration in implementation of the test:
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in
which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee's
opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3)
the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required
for his task, or his employment of helpers; (4) whether the service
95 See infra Part V.A for a discussion of which tests are used in making the status
determination for various statutes.
96 See infra Part V.A for a discussion of which statutes are subjected to multiple tests for
the status determination.
97 Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Donovan v.
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Donovan v. Sureway
Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981))) (action under FSLA).
98 Application to the NLRA may be especially problematic in light of the argument that
the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA rejected the application of the "economic reality"
test to the NLRA. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); see also H.R.
REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947) ("[Tihe Board expanded the definition of the term 'employee'
beyond anything that it ever had included before. .. )
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rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the
working relationship; and (6) whether the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer's business. 99 However, an
analysis of these factors is time-consuming and often produces
conflicting results.100 Accordingly, the test, in its current form, is too
cumbersome and unpredictable to use in defining employee for
purposes of the NLRA.
2. The "Hybrid" Test
The "hybrid" test combines elements of both the "function" test
and the "economic reality" test.101 It calls for a court to consider the
economic realities of the relationship between the employer and the
worker, as well as "the extent of the employer's right to control the
'means and manner' of the worker's performance." 102
In practice, the application of the test suffers from the same
uncertainties inherent in the "economic reality" test. 103 Additionally,
some courts have criticized the test in that there is "little discernible
difference between the hybrid test and the common law agency
test."1 0" Thus, the test may suffer from all the deficiencies previously
noted: the narrow analysis does not leave room for policy and
legislative history considerations, 15and the test is highly formalistic,
enabling an employer to circumvent the protections of the Act. For
these reasons, the "hybrid" test is not ideal for determining who is an
employee under the NERA.
99 See Martin, 949 F.2d at 1293.
100See, e.g., Darren M. Creasy, Note, A Union of Formalism and Flexibility: Allowing
Employers to Set Their Own Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1453, 1471 (2003) ("The strongest criticism of the economic realities
test, however, is that it necessitates an extensive inquiry involving numerous factors, resulting in
a time-consuming investigation that wastes judicial resources and produces inconsistent results."
(citing William D. Frumldn et al., Benefits Litigation: Spotting ERISA Issues in General
Employment Disputes and the Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 29 ANN. INST. ON
EMP. L. 8 81, 910 (2000))).
101 See, e.g., Cliff E. Spencer, Comment, Oregon's Independent Contractor Statute: A
Legislative Placebo for Employers, 31 WILLAMEITrE L. REV. 647, 673 (1995).
102Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cit. 1979) (applying the "hybrid" test to
a Title VII claim).
103 See supra Part II.C.lI for a discussion of the intrinsic uncertainties of the "economic
realities" test.
'
1 4Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying "function" test over
"hybrid" test to a claim arising under the ADEA).
105 See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of why these
considerations need to be included in any NLRA status determination.
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1111. PROPOSAL FOR THE "TRIFECTA" TEST
An ideal status determination test will incorporate the strengths of
the two tests the NLRB already utilizes while addressing the
weaknesses of those tests. Thus, a test that incorporates common-law
agency principles as required by Town & Country Electric, Inc., while
preserving a modified form of the "primary purpose" test, and
considers policy and legislative history would be ideal. Unfortunately,
such a complex test would likely be subject to manipulation and thus
would not offer the consistency that Board decisions in this area so
desperately need. However, infusing such a test with some bright-line
guides would likely improve consistency without sacrificing any of
the desired elements.
The result is the "trifecta" test which requires an adjudicator to
undertake three separate analyses. First, it must determine whether the
worker's objective primary purpose is economic. This analysis will be
modified from that which was undertaken in Brown University so as
to address the shortcomings identified.1'6 In its modified form, an
economic purpose will exist only in situations where the most sought
after benefit is money; an economic purpose will not exist, for
example, where a person is primarily seeking to enhance his
economic value in the marketplace. As this distinction is often
difficult to make, the adjudicator will consider, when necessary, the
objective "look and feel" of the relationship, including how
permanent the employment situation is, the existence of fringe
benefits, and any other relevant factors.1'0 The permanence of the
relationship is relevant because this may be indicative of the worker's
primary purpose.10 8 However, the adjudicator must bear in mind that
this will not always be the case-for instance, a person who works for
a temporary employment agency and therefore has no ongoing
relationship with any of her "user-employers" very well may have a
primarily economic purpose. 09 In addition, the extent to which the
worker is provided with fringe benefits will also contribute to the first
prong's "look and feel" analysis."'0
106 See supra Part ll.A for a discussion of the shortcomings of the "primary purpose" test.
107 Such factors may include the extent of the correlation between the work performed and
the compensation received, and the IRS's treatment of the money earned.
108 Frexample, a law student working as a clerk for a law firm while he is obtaining his
degree likely has a primary purpose other than his hourly compensation, i.e., experience.
'09See, e.g., H.S. Care L.L.C., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004) (holding that employees
employed solely by a user-employer and employees employed jointly by the user-employer and
a temporary agency were not an appropriate bargaining unit, hut nut indicating that the
employees of the temporary agency were ineligible for the protections of the NLRA as a
separate unit).
1"0 See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 486 (2004) (reasoning that the fact that graduate
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The second analysis will require the adjudicator to determine
whether the person fits the common-law definition of employee-i.e.
whether the person works subject to the control or right of control of
the employer in exchange for compensation. The final analysis
requires the adjudicator to consider the policy implications and
the legislative history support-that is, whether or not the
consequences of granting "employee" status are favorable from a
policy standpoint, and whether the consequences serve the underlying
purpose of the NLRA.
The "trifecta" test will be made less arbitrary by requiring an
adjudicator to hold that a person is not an "employee" if none of the
three prongs favors such a finding. Likewise, the adjudicator must
hold that the person is an "employee" where all three prongs favor a
finding of "employee" status. If two of the three prongs favor finding
"6employee" status, then the person challenging the status must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the one prong against such
status is strong enough to outweigh the other two prongs. Similarly,
where two of the three prongs disfavor a finding of "employee"
status, the clear and convincing evidence burden is on the person
seeking such status. Thus, the "trifecta" test incorporates all the
relevant considerations without sacrificing the consistency that would
accompany a more straightforward test.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE "TRIFECTA" TEST
Application of the "trifecta" test to typical graduate students and
house staff will result in a finding that only house staff are employees
for purposes of the NLRA. A contrary outcome will only occur where
the relationship between the graduate student or medical resident and
the educational employer is substantially different than the typical
relationship. Thus, the test enables the Board to continue to regulate
through ad hoc adjudication, but fosters the consistency that is found
where agencies engage in rulemaking. tt '1
students do not receive "any benefits, such as vacation and sick leave, retirement or health
insurance" is relevant to determining that the students are not "employees"); see also Boston
Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999) (reasoning that the fact that house staff "receive
fringe benefits and other emoluments reflective of employee status" is relevant to determining
that the house staff are "employees").
IIIIn general, the Board has not engaged in the rulemaking that some other administrative
agencies have, but rather, like the courts, has policed through ad hoc adjudication. While the law
clearly permits an agency to freely choose between rulemaking and adjudication, SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) ("[T]he choice made between proceeding by general
rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the
administrative agency."), there are certain benefits of rule-making. A primary benefit of creating
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A. Generally, Graduate Students Are Not "Employees"
While prongs one and two of the test could be disposed of by
reference to Brown University and New York University, respectively,
some further discussion is warranted. Under the "purpose" prong of
the test, the typical graduate student performing work for his
university while pursuing a degree is not an employee for purposes of
the Act because his primary purpose is educational. This primary
purpose is evidenced by the fact that graduate students receive
academic credit for their work. Furthermore, neither the university
nor the student expects the employment situation to be permanent-
there is a clear point of termination of the relationship: the point at
which the student receives his degree. Other characteristics of the
relationship between a university and a typical graduate student
demonstrate that the objective "look and feel" of the relationship is
not that of an employer-employee relationship. For instance, students
usually do not receive fringe benefits, students are eligible for student
tax exemptions, and usually there is no correlation between the work
performed and compensation received. Thus, the first prong disfavors
a finding that graduate students are employees for purposes of the
Act. However, the first prong does not show by clear and convincing
evidence that the typical graduate student is not an "employee.' 12
Therefore, consideration of the other prongs is required.
The second prong, which considers whether the worker is a
common-law employee, is relatively easy to satisfy and, therefore, is
satisfied by the typical graduate student. Clearly there will be
situations where this prong is not satisfied-for instance, if the
student is working relatively independently' 1 3 or if the student is
working purely for academic credit or tuition off-set as opposed to
"4compensation," as required at common law. As with the first prong,
however, the showing under this prong with regard to the typical
a rule of general application is that it often results in more consistent results. See, e.g., David L.
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921, 929-41 (1965).
112 Asstated above, under the test, one prong may be dispositive where the party shows by
clear and convincing evidence that it is strong enough to outweigh the other two prongs. The
first prong would constitute clear and convincing evidence of "employee" status (and thus
render the other prongs irrelevant) in a situation where a person is being compensated for
working in a position that holds little or no opportunity for promotion, and the person is also
lacking opportunity for further training. This unusual situation may be met by tenured university
faculty who do have the required training or expertise for administrative positions.
113 See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1208 n. 10 (2000) (noting that certain NYU
graduate students who perform research that is entirely for their own work, as opposed to being
for a faculty member, are not "employees").
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graduate student is not strong enough to meet the clear and
convincing evidence threshold such that the other two prongs are
irrelevant.114
Thus, in the case of the typical graduate student, the third prong,
which considers policy implications and legislative history support, is
dispositive as to whether the student is an employee for purposes of
the NLRA. In light of the consequences of giving students
"6employee" status, the third prong militates in favor of not providing
graduate students with the protections of the NLRA.
From a policy standpoint, there are serious consequences for
giving graduate students the right to engage in collective bargaining.
The Board recognized such consequences in Brown University.
There, the Board concluded that since the students' and the
universities' goals are not adverse (in fact, there is a mutual goal of
educational achievement), the main purpose of collective bargaining,
attaining equal bargaining power, was not necessary." 5 Furthermore,
equal bargaining power would improperly infringe on academic
freedom' 16 in that it would permit students to bargain regarding the
requirements to obtain a degree. Finally, since the academic
experience is a largely personal one, it is not well-suited for collective
bargaining. Thus, policy considerations favor finding that graduate
students are not "employees."
Additionally, granting graduate students rights under the NLRA
does not serve the underlying purposes of the Act. There is no
indication in the legislative history that Congress intended the
definition of "employee" to encompass all workers who are not
explicitly excluded by the language of the Act."17 Rather, the Act
covers only those situations where affording a particular class of
workers the protections of the Act will serve the Act's underlying
purpose."1 ' The objectives of the Act, as evidenced by the legislative
history, are not served by extending coverage to graduate students-
114 The second prong would constitute clear and convincing evidence of "employee" status
in a situation where the only goal of the employer is to exploit the worker's work product and
the only goal of the employee is to receive compensation for his work; this situation may be met
when a law student with no hospitality or management training works part-time at a restaurant
as a server.
115 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 (2004).
16Id
117 SeStephen L. Ukeiley, Graduate Assistants at the Bargaining table, But for How
Long?, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 643, 645 n.22 (2004) ("To illustrate the baselessness of
[a position to the contrary] consider the following: Does Congress's omission of dog walkers on
the list of excluded employees require their recognition as employees under the Act? Of course
not.").
11 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text for importance of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing commentary
regarding the purposes of the NLRA, to address divergent interests and unequal bargaining).
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the main interests of the university and the students are not adverse,
and this is not a situation where equality of bargaining power is
desirable.
Thus, both public policy and the legislative history of the NLRA
favor a finding that graduate students are not "employees." As such,
the third (and in this instance, decisive) prong dictates that graduate
students are not "employees."
B. Generally, House Staff Are "Employees"
While prong one, considering the worker's primary purpose, and
prong two, considering whether the worker is a common-law
employee, could be disposed of by reference to Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center'1 and Boston Medical Center Corp.,12 respectively, some
further discussion is warranted. The difficulties inherent in the first
prong of the test are highlighted in the circumstances of a typical
member of a hospital's house staff. House staff receive considerable
money as remuneration, but are also enhancing their future economic
value in the marketplace. Thus, the "look and feel" analysis is vital to
making a determination under the first prong.
The "look and feel" of the relationship somewhat resembles that
of an employer-employee relationship. 12 1  However, in general,
characteristics that are atypical of an employment relationship are
more prevalent. For instance, a member of the house staff rarely has
an expectation of ongoing employment.122 Furthermore, the aspects of
the relationship relating to education of the house staff do not "look
and feel" like an employer-employee relationship: the house staff are
all seeking some type of certification; in general, compensation is not
related to the hours worked or type of services provided;12 3 the
programs are generally designed to optimize the learning experience
119223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976), overruled by Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152
(1999).
120 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
121 See, e.g., Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. at 160 ("[House staff] receive fringe
benefits and other emoluments reflective of employment status."); see also The Ohio State
University Medical Center Benefits and Stipends, http://medicine.osu.edu/gmefaenefits (last
visited Mar. 20, 2008) (stating that residents and fellows at Ohio State Medical Center receive
many benefits including health insurance, sick leave, parental leave, vacation, liability
insurance, workers' compensation, and retirement benefits).
122 See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at 253 ("[T~he average stay of [house
staff] at Cedars-Sinai is less than two yer.... Only a few interns, residents, or clinical fellows
can expect to, or do, remain to establish an employment relationship with Cedars-Sinai.").
123 See Clinical Instructor Housestaff Stipend Level Fiscal Year 2008,
http://medicine.osu.edu/sitetool/sites/pdfs/medicinegmepublic/ResidentSalaryLevels-FY08.
pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (showing that house staff receive stipends based on ye.r
worked since graduating medical school).
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for the house staff (as opposed to maximizing benefits to the
hospital);124 and there are regular evaluations that are similar to
grades and examinations. 25A recent court ruling providing that
house staff may be eligible for student tax exemptions is a further
example of how the relationship is not a typical employment
relationship.12 6 Finally, the Board's evaluation of house staff under
the "primary purpose" test in Cedars-Sinai cannot be ignored-based
on the above features of the relationship between house staff and
hospitals, the Board was correct when it concluded "the housestaff s
relationship with [a hospital] is an educational rather than an
employment relationship."'127
The analysis under prong two is much more straightforward. A
worker is a common-law employee if he performs services for
another under a contract of hire, subject to the other's control or right
of control, and in return for payment.12 8 While, technically, house
staff are admitted to a teaching hospital, they also enter into what
resembles an employment contract. 19Such contracts, as well as
descriptions of the daily routine of a house staff member,130 evidence
the hospital's actual control over the house staff. Thus, house staff are
clearly common-law employees, and, therefore, prong two favors a
finding that they are covered by the NLRA.
Since prongs one and two are not in accord and neither is so
compelling as to provide clear and convincing evidence of the status
of house staff,'13' prong three is decisive as to whether house staff are
entitled to the rights provided for by the Act. The policy portion of
the analysis considers whether the consequences of providing house
staff with the protections of the Act, particularly the right to engage in
24 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at 253 ("The [house staff] programs
themselves were designed not for the purpose of meeting the hospital's staffing requirements,
but rather to allow the student to develop .. ,. skills necessary to the practice of medicine ... )
see also Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. at 176 (dissenting opinion) ("[The house staff]
assignments address the resident's educational needs, . . . and thus are quite the opposite of
employer assignments, which . .. focus[ ] on an employee's strengths to achieve maximum
output.").
125 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at 253-254.
126 See Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164
(D. Minn. 2007).
127 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
28 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country
Elec., Inc., 516 U.S& 85, 94 (1995)).
129 See, e.g., Limited Staff Agreement (2007-2008 Academic Year),
http://medicine.osu.edu/sitetoollsites/pdfs/medicinegmepublic/Linited-Staff..Agreement.pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (the agreement that residents and fellows at the Ohio State
University Medical Center hospital must sign).
30 Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 153-55 (1999).
131 See supra notes 112, 114 (discussing what would constitute clear and convincing
evidence for each of the first two prongs).
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collective bargaining, are desirable. Providing house staff with these
protections is not nearly as problematic as making such provisions for
graduate students. For instance, while teaching hospitals clearly share
a goal with the members of house staff-education of the house
staff-the hospitals are certainly more focused on patient care and
running a successful hospital. In light of this, collective bargaining
may be necessary to achieve an equality of bargaining power in the
numerous instances where the educational goals of the house staff
conflict with the economic goal of hospital administration to run a
profitable operation. 132
Additionally, the concern that collective bargaining would
improperly impose on the freedom of hospitals to run their
educational programs is minimal, because typically house staff spend
more time engaging in work that is performed by the "regular"
medical employees of the hospital than in educational pursuits.133
Therefore, the majority of the bargaining would pertain to economic
issues rather than educational issues, leaving the hospital relatively
free to set the parameters for the purely educational aspects of the
house staff's training. At the very least, the need to promote equality
of bargaining power due to the prevalence of economic issues
outweighs the need to preserve the hospital's right to completely
control the education of persons who have already completed medical
school. Thus, providing house staff with the right to engage in
collective bargaining is not problematic from a policy standpoint.
From a legislative history standpoint, the other component of
prong three, giving house staff the rights provided for in the Act
serves Congress's underlying purpose in enacting the NLRA. As
noted above, there are significant conflicting interests between house
staff and their hospitals,134 and therefore the NLRA should be used to
strike a balance between these interests. Furthermore, equality of
bargaining power is desirable where, as here, the primary conflicting
interests are wages and working conditions-in other words, the
NLRA should cover situations where it is necessary to "'redress the
"inequality of bargaining power" between employees and employers
132 For instance, an intern will likely receive more educational benefit if he is able to spend
more time observing each patient or doing each procedure, but the hospital will be more
successful if the intern observes patients and does procedures as quickly and efficiently as
possible.
133 Boston Med. COr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. at 160 ("[H]ouse staff spend up to 80 percent of
their time at the Hospital engaged in direct patient care [as opposed to attending didactic
lectures that more resemble the academic setting of a classroom].").
134 Particularly the interest of the house staff in receiving as much experience and
education as possible and the interest of the hospital in running an efficient and profitable
operation.
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and permnit wage earners to secure adequate compensation and
[working] conditions.""1, 3 5
Both policy and legislative history favor providing house staff with
the protections of the Act-therefore, the third, and decisive, prong
dictates that house staff are "employees" and therefore have a right to
engage in collective bargaining.
V. OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUTES' DEFINITIONS OF "EMPLOYEE"
A. Tests Currently Used Under Other Employment Statutes
Many of the federal labor and employment statutes suffer from the
same problem that the NLRA suffers from-that is, the definitions of
"employee" contained in the statutes are circular and vague and thus
provide little guidance as to who is covered by the various Acts. 136
Furthermore, administrative decisions and case law dealing with
status determinations under several of the federal employment
statutes often suffer from the same inconsistencies as NLRB
decisions-at times, courts and agencies are inconsistent in what test
they use to determine who is an employee under any given statute.
For instance, the circuits are split regarding the proper test to make
the status determination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act-the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits use the "function" test,137 while the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits use the "hybrid" test. 138 The circuits are also split
regarding the appropriate test for Title VII status determinations-the
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits use the
"function" test, 139 the Sixth and Ninth Circuits use the "economic
reality" test,1 '40 and the Fifth Circuit uses the "hybrid" test. 141
13 Brown, supra note 9 1, at 890 (alteration in original) (quoting Patrick M. Kuhlmann,
Comment, Thze Enigma of NLRA Section 2(11): The Supervisory Exclusion and the Case of the
Charge Nurse, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 157, 161). "Working conditions" includes the opportunity for
learning on the job.
136 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) ("ERISA's
nominal definition of 'employee' . . . is completely circular and explains nothing."); see also
supra note 7 (providing other examples of the vague definitions of employee under some of the
statutes).
13 See, e.g., Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hasp., 190 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1999);
Barnhart v. New York Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1998); Speen v. Crown
Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir. 1996); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436,
443 (6th Cir. 1996); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993).
138 See, e.g., Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas, 5 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th
Cir. 1993); Oestman v. Nat'l Farmers Union is. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992);
EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, 721 F.2d
979, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1983).
139 See, e.g., Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 207 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir.
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On the other hand, some tests are applied consistently to the same
statute, but there is no clear justification for why different tests are
used for different statutes. 142 For instance, cases arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act are judged under the "economic reality" test, 43
as are cases arising under the Family Medical Leave Act.1"4 Agencies
and courts making status determinations under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, on the other hand, use the "function" test.'14 5 The inconsistencies
in determining which workers are "employees" both within the same
statute and among the various employment statutes raises the issue of
whether, ideally, there should be one definition of "employee" that
applies to all federal employment statutes. While in-depth analysis of
this question is outside the scope of this Note, a brief consideration of
this question and whether the "trifecta" test provides a solution is
appropriate.
B. The Advantages and Disadvantages of One Common Definition of
''Employee"
In 1994, the Dunlop Commission 46suggested that "there is no
need for every federal employment and labor statute to have its own
definition of employee." 17However, the authors failed to provide any
2000) (holding that the common law test would prevail, although it referenced economic
realities); Vakharia, 190 F.3d at 805; Zinn v. McKune, 143 F.3d 1353, 1357 (10th Cir. 1998);
Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256, 259-60 (4th Cir. 1997); Cobb v. Sun Papers,
Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11 th Cir. 1982) (implementing the "common law test" despite referrng
to economic factors).
140See, e.g., Lovas v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 99-3213, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11840
(6th Cir. May 22, 2000); Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999).
141 See Deal, 5 F.3d at 118-19.
1421In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), the Court
reasoned that the FLSA "goes beyond its ERISA counterpart [in defining employee]," id. at 326,
but did not provide persuasive reasoning as to why.
"'s See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301
(1985); Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998).
'"4See, e.g., Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003); Smith v. BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., 273 F.3d 1303 (11 th Cir. 2001).
145 See, e.g., Nationwide Mat. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 322 (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act); Dykes v. Depuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 1998) (Americans with
Disabilities Act); Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 568 (6th Cir. 1998) (Americans with
Disabilities Act); Vizcalno v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) (Employee
Retirement Income Security Act).
'"1See THlE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 111 (1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/
key..workplace/2 [hereinafter THE DuNLOP COMMISION] (describing the commission appointed
by the Clinton Administration in 1993 and chaired by former Secretary of Labor and Harvard
professor, John Dunlop).
147 Id. at 65.
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support for their contention. There are certainly advantages to having
one common definition of employee. For instance, a common
definition would likely reduce litigation,148 limit uncertainty among
employers and employees as to whether the employees are entitled to
statutory protections, and would eliminate the circuit splits that
currently exist regarding what tests should be used to make the status
determination within a single employment statute.149
However, there are also significant disadvantages to having one
common definition of employee. For instance, the statutes serve
different purposes, and therefore different definitions may be
necessary to achieve these purposes.50 A common definition may be
too inflexible and thus result in over-inclusion and under-inclusion
problems.'15 ' Finally, to implement one common definition or test
would require legislative action, as the courts seem unable to agree on
this issue. Such action is often difficult to achieve; further-more, it is
particularly unlikely in light of the fact that Congress has not acted in
the fifteen years since the Dunlop Commission recommended that
"Congress adopt a single, coherent concept of employee and apply it
across the board in employment and labor law."15 2
C Application of the "Ti ifecta " Test to Other Employment Statutes
Many of the identified limitations of having one common
definition of "employee" would be negated by the third prong of the
"trifecta" test, because this prong ensures flexibility and requires
consideration of the underlying purpose of the employment statute at
issue. Therefore, the "trifecta" test may be ideal for the task the
148As the law stands now, a worker could be an employee under one statute, but not an
employee under another statute and therefore would have to bring multiple suits to determine
what protections he is entitled to. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 326 ("[The
FLSA] definition [of employee], whose striking breadth we have previously noted, stretches the
meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict
application of agency law principles [used to determine employee status under ERISA].").
149 For instance, the split regarding what test to use for the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, supra notes 137-138, and the split regarding what test to use for Title VU,
supra notes 126-28.
15)o instance, while it is not appropriate for graduate students to be considered
employees for purposes of the NLRA, it may be desirable that they be considered employees for
purposes of Title vn. See, e.g., Bakchtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132 (8th Cit. 2007) (involving a
Title Vfl claim brought by a graduate teaching assistant, in which the court did not even
consider whether the student lacked standing on the basis that he was not an employee).
151 For instance, the legislature likely intended for "confidential" employees, see supra
note 80 (providing definition), to have standing for purposes of most federal employment
statutes, but not for purposes of the NLRA. Therefore, if "confidential" employees satisfy a
common definition of "employee" there will be over-inclusion problems; whereas, if they do not
satisfy the definition, there will be under-inclusion problems.
151 DIE DUNLOP COMIvSrvSION, supra note 146, at 65-66.
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Dunlop Comm-ission set forth for Congress. It could be the vehicle for
realizing all the efficiency and other advantages of having a common
definition while minimizing the pitfalls of applying a definition across
the board to all federal labor and employment statutes.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the questionable status of graduate students and house
staff under the NLRA necessitates addressing the larger issue of the
definition of "employee" within the Act. Thus, the proposed solution,
the "trifecta" test, solves two problems-it enables a definitive
determination regarding the status of these two groups, and it
provides a consistent framework for the Board to apply in making all
status determinations. The proposed test incorporates the strengths of
the tests the Board has used in the past, addresses the weaknesses of
those tests, and is sufficiently flexible. Whether the "trifecta" test
poses an additional solution by providing a single, uniform concept of
'' employee'' for use in all federal labor and employment statutes is
uncertain. In the meantime, hospitals should not expect to be free
from the constraints of the Act, and universities should remain
confident in their right to remain union-free.
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